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ABSTRACT 
The paper provides a reflective analysis of the various problems encountered and lessons 
learned in the process of implementing a highly integrated programme designed to improve the 
livelihood security of the urban poor living in slums and low income settlements in secondary 
cities of Bangladesh. The study is based on the author’s day-to-day involvement with the project 
as an external action-research partner including review of relevant secondary literature. A 
number of key messages can be derived from this analysis which are essential to ensuring the 
success of project operations. These are: (i) a clear understanding of the links between project 
activities and project objectives by all staff, (ii) build capacity for all staff tailored to meet their 
needs, (iii) a clear specification of the targeting criteria and programme coverage, (iv) be fully 
equipped with necessary operational guidelines, work plans and M&E design before 
implementation, (v) ensure ‘partnership of organizations’ not ‘partnership of activities’, (vi) 
ensure real involvement of beneficiaries in all aspects of the project, (vii) ‘empowerment’ of the 
staff and a ‘flexible approach’ to operations is more rewarding, (viii) conduct routine reflection 
exercise on project progress, and finally (ix) be ready to undertake bold steps and make 
necessary strategic changes even if it requires significant deviations from pre-set activities and 
hypothetical schedules appearing in the project proposals.  
Word Count: 6,646. 
1. Introduction 
Learning from doing is often regarded as the best form of knowledge creation and experience, 
and the SHAHAR (1) project is not an exception. The present paper provides a reflective 
 analysis of the various problems encountered and lessons learned while implementing a highly 
integrated programme designed to improve livelihood security of the urban poor living in slums 
and low income settlements in selected secondary cities of Bangladesh. The project addressed 
four major components – community mobilisation and institutional strengthening; income 
generation activities; health, hygiene and nutrition education; and infrastructure development. 
The project was delivered via partnering local non-governmental organisations (PNGOs) and the 
local municipal authorities (Pourashavas). The project was implemented in four municipalities 
across Bangladesh – Tongi, Jessore, Dinajpur and Mymensingh, and reached approximately 
35,000 households. The project was one of the largest pilot urban projects in the world with an 
annual budget of approximately USD 3 million, over a five year period, and was considered as 
one of the highly innovative programmes in the CARE mission concerned with dealing with 
emerging and changing scenarios related to rights, governance and mobilisation (CARE, 2005; 
Khan, 2004). 
Conventionally, urban development projects tend to concentrate either on water, 
sanitation and infrastructure (e.g. Hanchett et al., 2003) or on institutional strengthening and/or 
improving governance (e.g., Miranda, 2004; Cavill and Sohail, 2004; Cohen, 2001) with little or 
no integration among these aspects. The innovation in this project was its attempt to integrate 
three key aspects affecting the livelihoods of the urban poor – promoting human rights and social 
justice (i.e., rights of the slum dwellers); building local capacity (i.e., to be able to mobilise 
resources by the poorer segment of community themselves); and improving and ensuring 
delivery of the basic goods and services by the responsible agencies (i.e., the Pourashavas). Also, 
the focus was to link physical improvements (e.g., infrastructure) to community processes and 
participation (e.g., community mobilization) which are important concerns in sustaining 
 development (Cohen, 2001). CARE-Bangladesh undertook this programme with action-research 
support from International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) to identify and develop best 
practices in urban programming (2). The study is based on information gathered by the author 
through his active involvement in the day-to-day operation of the programme, as well as from 
participation in several meetings, workshops, training sessions and examination of various 
project documents produced by the CARE-mission in connection with the operations of the 
project.   
The paper is organized into nine sections. Section 2 provides the background to, and the 
conceptualization and design of the project. Section 3 describes the first phase of implementation 
in two municipalities: Jessore and Tongi. Section 4 highlights the key problems that emerged in 
Jessore and Tongi and section 5 summarizes the lessons learned from this. Section 6 then 
describes the second phase of implementation in Mymensingh and Dinajpur, which took into 
account lessons learned from the first phase. Section 7 then provides a brief on further strategic 
changes undertaken in the SHAHAR project, whilst section 8 highlights some of the successes of 
the project. The final section concludes and highlights key features that are essential to ensure 
success of programme operations.  
2. The Birth of SHAHAR: Conceptualization and Design Phase 
CARE has been operating in Bangladesh for nearly 60 years, initially focusing on relief 
provision, then moving towards rural income generation and primary health care from 1970s 
(Sutter and Perin, 1998) and entered into the urban sector from the mid-1990s. CARE-
Bangladesh is relatively less experienced in urban programming, and as a result, the SHAHAR 
project was formed to better understand this environment (Khan, 2004).  
Preceding the launch of SHAHAR, CARE-Bangladesh conducted a livelihood security 
 assessment of urban slum households in the cities of Tongi, Khulna and Bogra in 1997, with 
technical assistance from IFPRI. The study identified five key inter-related problems facing the 
urban poor: (i) household income is unstable and insufficient to meet basic needs; (ii) people feel 
disenfranchised with no community initiatives to solve their problems; (iii) poor families live in 
extremely unhygienic environmental conditions; (iv) poor maternal health – women at risk 
during pre- and postnatal period; and (v) significantly higher maternal and child malnutrition 
rates (Sutter and Perin, 1998). The study also highlighted four basic constraints – income, health, 
and the environment, as well as lack of individual capacity/social cohesion to cope with the crisis 
– affecting livelihoods of the urban poor (Sutter and Perin, 1998). Consequently, the SHAHAR 
project was developed to address these constraints. The project design utilized the ‘Household 
Livelihood Security’ framework which CARE is still seeking to institutionalize in all of its 
programme areas worldwide.  
SHAHAR set its project goal as: sustainable promotion and protection of the food and 
livelihood security of vulnerable households in underdeveloped high-risk urban areas of selected 
secondary cities in Bangladesh by year 2004. Its four major components were: (a) infrastructure 
improvements (e.g., community toilets, drains, footpaths, water points) in the project sites 
(‘Infrastructure’); (b) Health, hygiene and nutrition education (‘Health'); (c) Income generating 
activities including vocational and skills training (‘Income’); and (d) Community mobilization 
and institutional strengthening (‘Community Mobilization’).   
SHAHAR project activities, beneficiary coverage, site selection and implementation plans 
The Development Activity Proposal of the Integrated Food Security Programme (IFSP) (3) 
outlined a list of 18 activities for SHAHAR, to be implemented in phases to reach 13 cities, 
involving 39 communities by the end of five years (detailed in CARE, 1998, p: 41-46). However, 
 SHAHAR ambitiously expanded its list of activities to 30 so that they would collectively 
establish a degree of ‘household livelihood security’ for urban vulnerable households. Also, the-
then SHAHAR project co-ordinator decided to select only four municipalities – Jessore and 
Tongi, in the first year, and Dinajpur and Mymensingh in the second year.  
The proposal envisaged that SHAHAR would benefit approximately 70,000 households 
(386,000 people) from its ‘Health’ component, 35,000 households from ‘Infrastructure’ 
component, and only 5,850 households from the ‘Income’ component, over the life of the project 
(CARE, 1998: p46). However, SHAHAR decided to cover all slums and low income settlements 
identified during the census survey, resulting in a total coverage of 11,228 households from 63 
sites in Jessore and 13,664 households from 21 sites in Tongi. Approximately, 60 percent of 
these households were expected to benefit from the ‘Income’ component of the project, whilst all 
households would benefit from the remaining components.  
PNGOs were the principal implementers of the ‘soft components’ (Income, Health and 
Community Mobilization) of the project, whilst the Pourashavas were responsible for delivery of 
the ‘hard component’ (Infrastructure). The selection of PNGOs followed a detailed selection 
process involving primary screening, appraisal and physical visit by SHAHAR staff. A total of 
14 PNGOs (9 in Tongi and 5 in Jessore) were selected as partners.  
3. Implementation Phase 1: Jessore and Tongi 
Start-up and general activities 
The start-up activities sequentially involved: (i) staff recruitment, (ii) a three-week “foundation 
training” course on urban programming delivered to all SHAHAR staff, (iii) selection of project 
sites, with assistance from the Pourashavas, (iv) a census survey of all sites, to count the actual 
number of beneficiaries, (v) the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the 
 partners (i.e., PNGOs and Pourashavas), and (vi) baseline surveys in Jessore and Tongi, with 
lead input from IFPRI. Starting from staff recruitment in July 1999 to completion of the baseline 
survey in September 2000, 14 months were elapsed to accomplish these start-up activities.  
Activities in the ‘Income’ component 
Planned activities in the ‘Income’ component involved: (i) formation of savings and credit 
groups with one adult woman from each household, (ii) a three-month gestation period to 
develop a savings habit, and (iii) the offer of credit from the fourth month by submitting a 
business proposal for scrutiny. Also, an ‘environmental assessment’ was made mandatory for 
business/activity proposals that might have a potential impact on the environment (e.g., dyeing 
industry).  
Activities in the ‘Health’ component 
Activities in the ‘Health’ component involved: (i) imparting health, hygiene and nutrition 
messages and raising awareness of roof-top gardening in weekly ‘Income’ meetings; (ii) 
compilation of a list of malnourished mothers and children for its nutrition programme; and (iii) 
listing of pregnant mothers and Traditional Birth Attendants in the locality.  
Activities in the ‘Community Mobilization’ component 
Activities in this component involved: (i) observing special days outlined in the Memorandum of 
Understanding; and (ii) the establishment of a Community Resource Centre, which became a 
centre for providing education to dropout children who never attended school in the community. 
Each PNGO set up one centre at a suitable project location.  
Activities in the ‘Infrastructure’ component 
The ‘infrastructure’ component was the most resource intensive component of the SHAHAR 
project, and was implemented by the Pourashavas. Here, the SHAHAR engineering staff were 
 involved in identifying, prioritizing, designing, budgeting and monitoring of the activities. The 
activities involved: (i) construction and/or repair of drains, footpaths, and community toilets; (ii), 
installation of water points (hand tube-wells); and (ii) detection and marking of arsenic-
contaminated tube-wells in project sites.  
Plan for capacity building 
SHAHAR emphasized the need for capacity building for all stakeholders and implemented it 
rigorously, mainly through training, cross-visits between project sites, participation in other 
urban programmes, as well as overseas visits to other urban projects. By September 2001, a total 
of 131 training sessions had been conducted, benefiting approximately 2,026 staff members from 
all partners.  
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) process 
The proposal envisaged the design of an M&E system using three levels of indicators (output, 
effect and impact indicators) that would provide valid information on: (i) success/failure of direct 
outputs; (ii) the intermediate effects of activities on knowledge, attitudes or practices; and (iii) 
the long-term impacts or fundamental changes in the livelihood security of participating 
households (CARE, 1998: p59). SHAHAR, based on its consultation of the proposal and USAID 
requirements, decided on the following M&E plan: (i) progress monitoring of the project and 
PNGOs; (ii) quarterly/annual progress reports (including expenditures) for USAID; (iii) IFSP 
requirements: (a) evaluations – baseline ‘for impact’, mid-term and final; (b) Time Series 
Surveys of seasonal livelihood monitoring (three times per year); and (c) Participatory 
Monitoring and Evaluation of behaviour change. A progress monitoring systemization strategy 
was eventually developed by March 2001, following a lengthy procedure (Figure 1). 
[Insert Figure 1 here]  
 4. Problems Encountered  
SHAHAR organized a series of brainstorming sessions at its field offices and at Headquarter 
between June – September 2001 to reflect on the project’s performance after the first year of 
implementation (which was 2.5 years since the birth of SHAHAR). Participants were asked to 
reflect on the accomplishments, key difficulties encountered and steps taken to resolve the 
problems. The workshops revealed that several problems had been encountered, ranging from its 
conception down to operations and management level. These are discussed below. 
Problems at the conceptual and design level 
SHAHAR management felt that the design of the project was largely focused on the Pourashava. 
Therefore, if the Pourashavas failed to cooperate or act according to expectations, the total 
intervention was likely to fail. The management stressed the importance of a clear focus on 
governance, a difficult task to achieve but necessary to avoid constraining the project. 
Participants also identified that the project design had focused only on slums, thus ignoring the 
broader issue of urbanization and the management of urban areas. Conventionally, slum people 
were treated by the Pourashavas as unauthorized residents in an urban context and often 
neglected. Trying to promote a suitable urban service delivery mechanism for them was, 
therefore, problematic. In some cases, the ‘threat of eviction’ actually took place in selected 
communities of Jessore and Tongi.  
SHAHAR staff also felt that there was a general lack of civic sense for cleanliness by all 
citizens. Accordingly, a “cleaning day” was observed in the communities in September 2001 as a 
way to develop such a civic sense of cleanliness.  
Additionally, the level and stages of involvement by the various government agencies in 
this project was not always clear. For example, although SHAHAR’s link with the Pourashava 
 was clear but it was much less clear with the Local Government and Engineering Department. 
Also, the approach undertaken by SHAHAR contradicted the approaches of other agencies 
engaged in similar interventions. For example, UNICEF implemented individual latrine projects, 
whereas SHAHAR was promoting the ‘community latrine’ for similar types of beneficiaries. The 
idea to establish uniformity in project implementation by all PNGOs in all sites was itself 
constraining, thereby, preventing the utilization of PNGOs’ own experience in programme 
operations. Tensions also occurred within the community over the use of the Geocode Card 
which had been handed to beneficiary households during the initial identification census. 
However, some presumed it as an instrument for getting huge benefits from CARE (mostly as 
relief) and traded with other non-eligible households.  
Operational problems  
A key problem that emerged at the operational level involved SHAHAR field offices as well as 
PNGOs seen as too much absorbed in the ‘Income’ component of the project. The PNGOs 
rushed to form groups within first three months of implementation leading to haphazard selection 
of women without carefully identifying the truly needy and willing participants in the group. 
Also, with ambiguity present in the targeting criteria, the groups contained a mix of wealthy 
participants, which weakened group solidarity. Frequent dropout of members from the groups 
put PNGOs under severe pressure to maintain ideal group size. Also multiple involvements of 
same women as a member of other NGOs were overlooked.  
Lack of clear operational guidelines led to confusion and a lack of compliance in 
screening of the proposed business plans. The major thrust of the PNGOs was to provide loans to 
earn interest income bypassing the needed emphasis on vocational and skills training component. 
Migration of some beneficiaries after taking loans deterred PNGOs from providing further loans. 
 In some cases, beneficiaries in turn stopped making deposits. Also, eviction of some 
beneficiaries from their homes meant that the group itself disappeared.  
Since operational guidelines of the ‘Health’ component were not in place during the 
initial phase of implementation, PNGOs resisted implementing the finalized ‘Health’ 
programme, which seemed bulkier than their expectations. The ‘Health’ education sessions at the 
‘Income’ weekly meetings were preoccupied with loan collection and savings instead. In 
addition, frequent revision of directives and memos regarding the operation of ‘Health’ 
component demoralized staff.  
The establishment of Community Resource Centres was applauded by most of the 
beneficiaries as their children could attend ‘any time schools’ run in these premises. These 
centres also served as venues for community meetings. However, inclusion of schooling in the 
programme demanded too much staff time, with no clear guideline on what this activity sought 
to achieve. The substantial effort put into ‘observance days’ also added a serious burden to staff 
time, although it was highly applauded by the communities.  
Managerial problems  
According to the feedback, the team in charge of designing the SHAHAR project did not fully 
analyze its operational difficulties. Staff planning seemed inadequate, given the diverse and large 
scale nature of project activities. In addition, there were weaknesses in management and change 
of senior management (project co-ordinator) also affected the project. Furthermore, most of the 
staff recruited in SHAHAR were staff promoted from other projects of CARE, as well as from 
other agencies, and they themselves were in the learning phase and inexperienced to work in an 
urban environment. In addition, the management approach undertaken in SHAHAR was 
‘inward’ rather than ‘opening up’ to all staff as the sharing mechanisms of experiences and 
 pitfalls were not developed. There were problems, also, in the flow of information: with PNGOs, 
with the Pourashavas, between field offices and SHAHAR Headquarter. 
Problems related to Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) activities 
Staff shortage was identified as the key problem here hindering the effective monitoring of the 
SHAHAR project. Since there was no specific plan for monitoring prior to implementation, the 
staff faced difficulty in internalizing its importance. Weakness existed in streamlining 
performance indicators and in devising a concrete strategy to feed these indicators from progress 
monitoring into project evaluation. In addition, commitment towards monitoring by PNGOs and 
the Pourashavas was very low, in terms of degree and quality. Moreover, an essential step for 
strengthening the capacity of the Pourashavas and PNGOs, prior to implementing such a 
complex intertwined set of interventions, was ignored; consequently, their involvement in 
monitoring was delayed. Also crucial to the success of the project, the key position of Project 
Development Officer (Management Information Systems) at Headquarter remained vacant, 
leading to a major drawback in the organization and synthesis of available information. The 
emphasis placed by the CARE mission to meet ‘environmental sustainability’ increased staff 
workload of all partners. By the start of year three of SHAHAR, a major change occurred in 
M&E design. Previously, each project of IFSP was responsible for its own M&E activities and, 
therefore, staffed with relevant personnel in the individual projects. However, the CARE mission 
management decided to centralize the M&E system. As a result, all M&E staff of individual 
projects was transferred to a central Technical Support Unit. The role of the centralized M&E 
system of IFSP and its link with SHAHAR soon became unclear.  
Problems related to partnering with PNGOs  
It is clear in this case that the concept of ‘true participation’ has not been put into practice and 
 the practiced strategy showed ‘partnership of activities’, not ‘partnership between organizations’. 
PNGOs were basically working as ‘sub-contractors’ with SHAHAR dictating the ideas and 
activity plans, and PNGOs abiding by the instructions. The overall mechanism was affected by a 
lack of capacity in the partners as well as lack of a unified approach to partnership. Traditional 
practice in micro-credit operation by PNGOs affected the project. All PNGOs showed a tendency 
towards financial gains rather than on improving the plight of the urban poor. Also, there were 
time and manpower constraints, both in terms of quality and quantity. High turnover and 
unskilled staff in PNGOs also affected the quality of implementation. Some staff felt that the 
selection process of PNGOs was flawed leading to inclusion of weak NGOs as partners. For 
example, one of the PNGOs in Tongi was terminated, as it did not pass the internal audit 
conducted by SHAHAR on its operations. 
Problems related to partnering with the Pourashavas 
Bureaucracy inherent in the government employees also plagued the Pourashava officials. 
Typical of this project, the Pourashavas suffered from personnel shortage, as well as low 
capacity, and tended to be focused on large visible activities (e.g., construction of big drain 
networks and long footpaths). In addition, the coverage of the project was also huge: 63 sites in 
Jessore and 21 sites in Tongi, thereby, raising the question of manageability by all parties with 
paucity of staff.  
Problems at the beneficiary level 
It is clear that the activities of the SHAHAR project in these neglected locations inevitably raised 
expectations of the communities. However, a number of significant problems arose resulting in 
ineffectiveness of the project. For example, some beneficiaries did not provide correct 
information during census surveys, perhaps the result of past bitter experience with NGOs by the 
 community affected their interest in the project. Beneficiaries hid their multiple involvements 
with other NGOs. Serious misunderstandings arose also between beneficiaries and contractors 
(for the ‘Infrastructure’ component), and due to such misunderstanding, even good works done 
by contractors were not recognized. Additionally, staff were largely engaged in accomplishing 
defined activities while neglecting interactions with the community; the proportion of time spent 
with beneficiaries by staff was minimal. Lack of group cohesiveness also seemed to be a major 
problem caused in part, by a number of beneficiaries who fled after receiving loans, ultimately 
affecting the entire group. Group cohesiveness could have been achieved if the community 
mobilisation had been in place from the start. 
Problems related to the ‘Infrastructure’ component 
SHAHAR also placed major emphasis on the ‘infrastructure’ component. Although, the project 
claimed 100% achievement of its first year target, several problems remained. The issue of 
maintenance of infrastructure has not been thought through leading to domination of vested 
interest groups in management committees. However, the level of community involvement 
increased sharply after completion of the facilities. The issue of land tenure added to the problem 
in locating ‘community toilets’ and drainage networks. Moreover, the influence of the 
Pourashavas and lack of previous experience in dealing with vested interest groups in an urban 
context led to choice of infrastructure interventions located on the periphery of the sites, while 
the internal disruption of drainage system remained unattended.  
External influence 
Various tensions during the operation of the project were created by external interference. 
Interference by staff external to the project somewhat demoralized SHAHAR staff. Everyone 
wanted to offer their own advice without understanding the complexities, needs and 
 requirements of the project. SHAHAR staff, confused with such a diversity of suggestions, 
quickly became frustrated. Also, major changes in the IFSP M&E system, in its initial stage, 
created a vacuum in M&E activities.  
5. Lessons Learned 
Important lessons were learned by the mid-term of the project cycle. The first was the realization 
that each of the SHAHAR components could have been an individual project in itself. Therefore, 
unless each activity of each component was clearly demarcated, staff would stray from the 
project goal and would be burdened with multifaceted unforeseen problems. This led to an 
understanding of the importance of having ‘all component guidelines’ in place. The initial idea 
of starting the project by keeping up with the hypothetical schedule set in the proposal, and then 
to develop the programme activities at leisure, proved to be seriously flawed.  
The component guidelines should clearly delineate each activity and must focus on the 
achievement of project objectives. Since multiple staff members of varying capacity were 
implementing the project activities, only clearly defined operational guidelines could meet the 
needs of standardized implementation strategies common to all. Such a realization led SHAHAR 
to spend several months in developing and finalizing these guidelines. SHAHAR also felt a need 
to revise the ‘Income’ guideline after a year of implementation, with the principal concern of the 
security of huge savings and insurance collected by the PNGOs from their group members. 
Another tripartite arrangement between the Pourashavas, PNGOs and the beneficiary 
representatives became necessary to ensure protection of savings and insurance plus continuation 
of this ‘Income’ package to beneficiaries once SHAHAR phased out in 2004. 
The second lesson learned was the importance of understanding the link between the 
components and the project objectives. This required a thorough internalization of the logic and 
 mechanism by which each activity contributed to the overall project goals. For example, the 
‘Infrastructure’ component was implemented by Pourashavas, involving only engineers from 
SHAHAR, with minimal contact with the PNGOs who were responsible for implementing the 
remaining three ‘soft components’ for the same target beneficiaries. However, when 
infrastructure maintenance committees from among the project beneficiaries were formed, the 
situation improved. 
The third lesson learned was the coverage of sites and beneficiaries relative to resource 
availability. SHAHAR was implemented at 63 sites in Jessore and 21 sites in Tongi covering 
25,000 households as beneficiaries. This was a huge number of people for a limited staff to 
cover, especially when they had minimal knowledge of how to implement various components of 
the project.  
The fourth lesson learned was the number of partners to be selected. A total of 14 PNGOs 
were selected (9 in Tongi and 5 in Jessore), who in turn varied considerably in size, experience 
and competence in urban programming, itself posing an additional problem in ensuring 
continuous dialogue and interaction.  
The fifth lesson learned was the quality of the Memorandum of Understanding, which 
specified too many items without proper justifications. Since this was the first legal document 
with which SHAHAR went into partnership with PNGOs and the Pourashavas, making 
amendments was not easy. The partners usually tended to utilize the benefits specified in the 
document instead of focusing on their own contribution and commitment towards the poor. 
The sixth lesson learned was the uneven sequencing of components in the field. There 
was a rush to start the activities to stay on schedule. Therefore, the ‘Income’ component 
activities were implemented first at full throttle. Infrastructure improvement with the 
 Pourashavas followed, but leaving the rest of the components behind. The ‘Community 
Mobilization’ component was deferred for a year and the ‘Health’ component could not be fully 
implemented due to the apparent lack of direction and guidelines. This resulted in complete 
absorption of all the activities, including human resources, by two components, covering 
essentially only one of the three strategic objectives of the project.  
The seventh lesson learned was the importance of M&E activities to the success of 
project implementation. The initial Logical Framework tended to be all-inclusive, resulting in a 
plethora of diverse activities under each of the components. After a few months of 
implementation in Jessore and Tongi, it was felt that streamlining the Logical Framework was 
vital, to keep the project on track and to produce valid indicators of performance. At the same 
time, the overall IFSP programme decided to streamline all of its projects to work within a 
unified Logical Framework aimed at contributing relevant indicators so that they collectively 
achieve the overall goal set in the proposal for IFSP. This streamlining was also passed down to 
SHAHAR, which enabled it to reduce its own Logical Framework.  
6. Expansion Phase 2: Mymensingh and Dinajpur 
SHAHAR, in its second year of implementation, expanded to two new secondary cities, Dinajpur 
and Mymensingh, equipped with the lessons learned from Phase 1 of implementation. 
Entering the community 
SHAHAR learned the hard lessons with respect to issues such as: (i) strategies to understand the 
community, (ii) effective targeting of beneficiaries, (iii) streamlining volume and nature of 
activities, and (iv) strategies for selecting faithful and capable partners for implementation. 
Consequently, SHAHAR decided to initiate a rigorous process of activities aimed at 
understanding the diverse community needs and priorities before project implementation in 
 Dinajpur and Mymensingh. The overall strategy consisted of five stages in the following 
sequences: (a) widespread inception sessions in the community introducing the project with 
involvement of all partners and other government officials, (b) a complete census of households 
in project sites with a revised questionnaire, (c) preparation of community profiles based on 
information collected from each site, (d) intensive Participatory Learning and Action sessions for 
each component of the intervention package, and (e) a baseline survey of the project sites with 
representative sampling. It is worth noting that SHAHAR also went through similar stages in 
Jessore and Tongi earlier but with limited focus and unplanned sequencing of activities.  
Downsizing the coverage of beneficiaries 
Based on the knowledge that extensive coverage itself posed a problem of monitoring and 
keeping track of progress, it was decided that the number of households would be limited to 
4,000 in each city. Therefore, after careful scrutiny, SHAHAR decided to undertake 13 sites (out 
of 59) in Dinajpur and 17 sites (out of 83) in Mymensingh that deemed to be the most vulnerable 
in terms of overall livelihood security. The total number of households stood at 3,744 (15,866 
persons) in Dinajpur and 4,413 (20,091 persons) in Mymensingh, which was far lower than the 
number of beneficiaries targeted in the Jessore and Tongi sites. 
Selecting the partners 
Since SHAHAR utilized a strategy to allocate approximately 2,000 households for each partner 
NGO, the number of partners in Dinajpur and Mymensingh consequently was reduced 
substantially to three in each city. The selection criteria for partners were also revised 
substantially. 
Sequencing of activities 
Since the sequencing of activities posed a problem in Jessore and Tongi, a decision was taken to 
 change the order of implementation of components. First, preliminary work on assessing the 
need for infrastructure improvement started. Once the PNGOs got on board, the primary focus 
was on the formation of groups for delivery of the ‘Income’ and the ‘Health’ components, with 
simultaneous implementation of the ‘Community Mobilization’ component. The dissemination 
of loan monies was initiated at a much slower pace, beginning after 5–6 months of group 
formation. Moreover, maintenance committees were formed prior to the implementation of the 
infrastructure schemes, so that resources could be properly utilized and the beneficiaries could 
develop a sense of ownership.   
Project preparation prior to implementation 
SHAHAR, again, learning from Phase 1, placed high importance on having all of the operational 
guidelines in place prior to the start of activities in Dinajpur and Mymensingh and the field staff 
for Dinajpur and Mymensingh enjoyed the privilege of attending all the previous important 
meetings with the partners, acquainting them with the pros and cons of the project 
implementation in Jessore and Tongi. The results of the census surveys and community profile 
exercises of these two cities were disseminated to the stakeholders, thereby making the PNGOs 
and the Pourashavas well aware from the start of the situation of the sites.   
M&E Design 
The M&E plan in Dinajpur and Mymensingh followed the streamlined unified Logical 
Framework of IFSP, and various case studies and livelihood studies were planned in Dinajpur as 
a part of the SHAHAR–IFPRI collaboration. 
Learning strategy 
The project activities and action plans in Dinajpur and Mymensingh progressed according to a 
carefully prepared schedule and close coordination among Headquarter and field offices. The 
 pace of the project activities was optimized after realizing the difficulties that arise when 
implementation plans are rushed to meet hectic schedules. High importance was also attached to 
learning from experience during implementation. Therefore, a learning strategy was developed 
that equipped the implementers to detect problems quickly and devise solutions to overcome 
those. 
7. Further strategic changes in SHAHAR 
In January 2002, a new project co-ordinator was appointed (the third during the life of the 
project), who again decided to conduct in-depth reflective exercises with all staff and partners to 
understand progress with the project and to identify changes that were necessary. This was done 
by a review of best practices of similar projects elsewhere. A five-day retreat was organised in 
March 2002, which led to a ‘Landmark’ and ‘Turning point’ event (Khan, 2004a). 
 Four key strategic changes were devised and implemented over the remaining life of the 
project. The first was the removal of segregation between the ‘hard components’ (i.e., 
infrastructure) and the ‘soft components (i.e., ‘Income’, Health’, and ‘Community 
Mobilization’). Such barriers had, before, confined engineers to concentrate only on construction 
activities without any interactions with staff from ‘soft components’, which led to maintenance 
problems of the constructed facilities.  
The second strategic change was in the structure of SHAHAR itself. The project was 
divided into strategic, tactical and operational levels. At the operational level, a ‘team approach’ 
was adopted with an Area Team Leader and 4-5 Facilitators composed of staff experienced in 
engineering as well as aspects of the ‘soft components’. Training sessions were provided, 
tailored to the needs of the staff, so that each team could operate competently on all components 
of the project. At the tactical level, field management, comprising of Area Manager and the Area 
 Team Leaders, acted as a support for the area teams. Finally, at the strategic level, the co-
ordination unit was set to oversee the project and to deal with strategic and policy level issues, by 
improving and strengthening reporting structures (for details of the new organogramme, see 
Khan, 2004a).  
The third strategic change was the adoption of a ‘flexible approach’, as past experience 
had shown that high dependency on guidelines and generic operational plans usually hampered 
progress. This is particularly important as SHAHAR operated in areas with vastly different 
characteristics. Therefore, each field office was asked to draw up their own operational plans to 
suit their sites. The component guidelines served, therefore, only as a guide, and not as a 
document that had to be strictly adhered to, even when circumstances not covered by the 
guidelines required deviation from pre-set operational steps. ‘Empowerment’ of field staff was 
the key strategy that was adopted with success in this approach, backed up, of course, by due 
‘accountability’.  
Finally, the key question of whether the ‘activities can sustain’ once the project ceases 
led to the development of a ‘Pressure Plates Model’ by the project co-ordinator, through active 
consultation with all stakeholders. Simply put, the model attempts to create an environment 
where the pressure emanates from one of the smallest units of the communities, the households 
(for details on how this model works, see CARE, 2005; Khan, 2004, 2004a). A Community 
Resource Management Committee was also formed/restructured in all areas to ensure 
representation from all special interest groups from each wealth band.            
8. The effectiveness of the SHAHAR project and its strategic changes 
The IFSP Mid-term Review, conducted in June 2002 (a few months after implementing the 
strategic changes), concluded with a high commendation for SHAHAR’s transformation. The 
 review noted that “a new spirit of enquiry and reflective practice is emerging among staff and the 
positive impacts of this are already being witnessed. Intervention strategies are being explored 
and tested in different ways, flexibility exists in implementation activities, data is being used 
more to guide decision making, and staff are developing a richer understanding of the social, 
economic and political context of urban areas” (CARE, 2003: 33-34).  
Use of the ‘Pressure Plate Model’ was also successful, as evidenced by several examples 
where the community took an increasing role to determine their own future. Two examples 
worth mentioning: (i) the eviction of 77 households from one site in Jessore after 20 years of 
their stay. The community, through the Community Resource Management Committee, placed 
sufficient pressure on the local administration, leading not only to relocation of these households, 
but also to secure tenurial rights in that relocated area (CARE, 2005: 19-20); (ii) exclusion of 
individual households in two sites of Dinajpur, who were later provided with leasing rights from 
the municipality. These were significant successes for the project, as they were among the first 
successful examples in Bangladesh where the community had fought for their tenurial rights and 
succeeded (Khan, 2004a).  
The emphasis over ‘environmental assessment’ on the SHAHAR infrastructure projects 
also provided a success story. A comparative study of one of the SHAHAR sites in Tongi and 
City-Polly slum under the governments’ Slum Improvement Project in Dhaka revealed that, 
because of the ‘environmental assessment’ exercise, SHAHAR had constructed an additional 320 
m of drain, thereby mitigating problems relating to drainage and wastewater. The SHAHAR site 
in addition, was noted as having a fewer environmental problems compared with the City-Polly 
slum (Chowdhury and Amin, 2006). 
 
 9. Summary and Conclusion  
The SHAHAR project, conceived as a large-scale pilot project in urban programming to generate 
learning and best practices, underwent a series of changes from its inception. Although the birth 
of the SHAHAR project was based on a sound premise, the initial design of the project posed a 
major challenge of integration and consolidation. The four components – ‘Infrastructure’, 
‘Income’, ‘Health’, and ‘Community Mobilization’ – were capable of functioning as individual 
projects, although in such a case the achievement of overall livelihood security would have been 
less achievable. However, people learn from mistakes and SHAHAR was no exception. The 
various lessons learned in its first phase of implementation were carefully incorporated when 
SHAHAR moved into the two new cities in its second year and the four key strategic changes 
undertaken during the mid-term of the project led to significant improvements. 
The key messages that can be derived from this reflective analysis are: (i) every member 
involved in the project must fully understand the links between each project activity and the 
project objectives; (ii) capacity building of all members is a must; (iii) clear specification of 
targeting criteria and programme coverage must be decided in advance; (iv) project management 
must be fully prepared with all necessary operational guidelines, work plans and M&E processes 
prior to implementation; (v) when multiple agencies are involved, ‘partnership of organizations’ 
should be ensured rather than ‘partnership of activities’, which is essentially no different than 
sub-contracting, with consequential loss of commitment; (vi) the number of partners should be 
kept at a minimum level and they should be of adequate quality; (vii) project beneficiaries should 
be involved in real terms in all phases of the project in order that they build a clear sense of 
ownership and acceptance of the project; (viii) the ‘empowerment’ of the staff and a ‘flexible 
approach’ to operation is more rewarding and produces dividend in terms of project outcomes; 
 (ix) thorough reflective exercises on the project progress should take place routinely; and finally 
(x) project management should not hesitate to undertake major strategic changes, even if these 
require significant deviations from pre-set activities and hypothetical schedules that appear in the 
proposal. Such proposals are often written by consultants in order to apply for funding in 
advance and, in practice, as such are likely to take precedence and dictate subsequent actions 
(because donor agencies like to hold on to these documents while evaluating project 
performance) which may eventually restrict and/or inhibit well conceived projects from to 
delivering effectively with success. The SHAHAR project surpassed such conventional practice 
and, therefore, eventually succeeded in its endeavours.  
 Notes 
1 SHAHAR stands for Supporting Household Activities for Hygiene, Assets and Revenue.  
2 Since 1997, CARE and IFPRI have collaborated on increasing knowledge about urban 
livelihoods and worked in a number of countries, e.g., Tanzania, Mozambique, Peru and 
Ethiopia (Garrett, 2004). 
3 IFSP is the core five-year programme (1999 – 2004) with four distinct projects, of which 
SHAHAR is one and is the only urban project, whereas the remaining are rural projects. 
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